This paper studies the dynamics of investor overconfidence. Using the deviation from his benchmark index as a proxy for confidence, we show that the average mutual fund manager tends to boost his confidence to a larger extent after receiving confirming public signals than to decrease it after disconfirming public signals. This bias is stronger among inexperienced managers and is largely absent among experienced ones. The bias also leads to poor future performance, most of which is driven by managers' sub-optimal portfolio choices rather than excessive trading. In dissecting managers' portfolio choices, we further document that underperformance resulting from the bias is mainly due to managers' increasingly active stock picks within industries they are less familiar with (i.e., those industries that they underweight relative to their benchmark indices).
Introduction
Recent empirical studies find that agents' overconfident beliefs (i.e., attaching too high a precision to one's private signals) could lead to sub-optimal decisions. For example, Barber and Odean (2000 , 2001 , 2002 document that individual investors trade excessively despite earning negative returns net of transactions costs. Using late option exercising as a measure of managers' overconfidence, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2010) find that overconfidence can help explain suboptimal corporate investment, valuedestroying mergers, and equity financing decisions. It is, however, unclear how these beliefs are formed. Is overconfidence a personal trait or do agents gain excessive confidence over time, perhaps from their past experiences?
Two theoretical studies try to provide an answer to this question. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) model the evolution of overconfidence by formalizing a well-established behavioral bias, dubbed the self-serving attribution bias, which states that people attribute successes to their own skills but failures to bad luck or other external factors.
1 More specifically, when agents can only learn about the unobserved quality of their private signals through noisy feedbacks, upon observing confirming public signals they tend to overestimate their ability to obtain private signals and revise the perceived precision of their signals upward too much, relative to the Bayesian benchmark. On the other hand, they revise the precision downward too little with disconfirming public signals. Agents therefore accumulate unwarranted confidence after receiving a number of positive and negative public signals, which can be purely due to luck. Investors in financial markets are particularly susceptible to the self-serving attribution bias, as investment decisions can only be verified with vague and delayed feedbacks.
This paper is one of the first empirical attempts to bring the biased-attribution hypothesis to the data.
2 We formalize our test hypothesis in a simple stylized model in the spirit of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) . An informed agent receives a private signal about the stock payoff, updates his self-perceived precision of the private signal based on the realizations of public signals, and chooses his portfolio accordingly. Departing from the Bayesian benchmark, we assume that the informed agent suffers from the self-serving attribution bias. The model predicts that the part of perceived precision (or confidence) that is due to biased attribution is monotonically increasing in the sum of positive investment returns (SP R) over a period. Specifically, a positive investment return signifies that the agent's private signal is confirmed by a public signal, and a negative investment return signifies otherwise; while the former significantly inflates the agent's confidence, the latter only mildly deflates it. This biased updating stands in contrast to rational Bayesian updating, under which the agent inflates and deflates his confidence by the same extent after positive and negative returns. The main testable proposition of our stylized model is therefore that, after controlling for the sum of all returns over the period, the deviation of a portfolio from its benchmark index (measured by the Active Share), which reflects the agent's confidence in his private signals, should be monotonically increasing in SP R under the influence of the self-serving attribution bias.
3 On the other hand, if the agent is a Bayesian, then the Active Share will only be increasing with the sum of all returns but not with SP R.
We test our prediction by examining the portfolio choices and trading behavior of a particular group of agents -active mutual fund managers, for whom we have detailed and comprehensive information on their investment decisions and realized performance. While our stylized model points to an intuitive measure, SP R, to capture the impact of biased attribution on investors' portfolio choices, the effectiveness of SP R in the data depends crucially on how managers update their beliefs about the precision of their private signals. Since one month is a natural horizon for performance evaluation, we conjecture that a typical mutual fund manager maintains a separate mental account for his performance in each month and thus updates his beliefs monthly. Accordingly, in the empirical section, we introduce a measure of SP R based on monthly mutual fund returns. At the end of each month t, for every mutual fund i we construct a measure SP R i,t by summing up all positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the previous year. 4 We use benchmark-adjusted rather than raw fund returns in our variable definition because an uninformed manager (or one who thinks he is uninformed) can earn the benchmark return by simply tracking the index.
To isolate the effect of SP R from other confounding factors that may affect managers' portfolio choices, such as risk aversion, in the full specification we control for tracking errors, turnover, and fund flows, among other observable fund characteristics. As our model suggests, we also control for the past one-year sum of benchmark-adjusted returns. We argue that the residual effect of lagged SP R on changes in Active Share reflects managers' biased-attribution.
Our results are consistent with the biased-attribution hypothesis. The effect of lagged SP R on (changes in) Active Share is economically and statistically significant. A onestandard-deviation increase in SP R, ceteris paribus, leads to increases in Active Share by 0.55% (t=3.26) and 0.42% (t=2.48) in the following two quarters, both of which are similar in magnitude to the average change in Active Share over a quarter. We also find that the tendency to self-attribute is the most pronounced for managers in the bottom quartile sorted by years of experience, proxied by the number of years since fund inception; a one-standarddeviation increase in SP R leads to an increase in Active Share by 0.63% in the bottom quintile. Managers in the top quartile of experience are virtually unaffected by the bias, suggesting that experience can help alleviate the bias.
Moreover, if mutual fund managers are subject to the self-serving attribution bias, i.e., accumulate unwarranted confidence in response to SP R, and make sub-optimal investment decisions thereafter, they should experience deteriorating future performance with high SP R. We find support for this prediction in the data. SP R significantly and negatively predicts risk-adjusted fund performance in the next one to five years. A one-standard-deviation increase in SP R leads to a reduction of 60bp in annual abnormal fund returns subsequently. We obtain similar results when mutual fund returns are calculated from fund holdings reported by Thompson Financial.
5 These findings suggest that the underperformance resulting from self-serving attribution is not driven by excessive trading, but rather by managers' poor portfolio choices. These results also imply that mutual fund managers do not get infinitely overconfident even with the attribution bias: overconfident managers on average underperform their peers, which in turn lowers their confidence in the private signals.
To further examine the exact changes in portfolio choices as a function of SP R, we decompose Active Share into two parts: Across-Industry Active Share (AIAS) and WithinIndustry Active Share (W IAS). The former measures a portfolio's deviation in industry weights from its benchmark index, while the latter measures the average deviation in individual stock weights within each industry from the benchmark. Such a decomposition is motivated by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) , who suggest that fund managers may have stock picking ability concentrated in a few industries. Consistent with the findings in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) , we show that the performance predictability of Active Share is largely contributed by its across-industry component, yet managers substantially increase their W IAS, but not their AIAS, in response to lagged SP R. In particular, we find that managers tend to increase their W IAS in industries managers underweight relative to their benchmark indices. One possibility is that, while managers possess stock-picking skills in a few industries, they become more active stock pickers overall (i.e., in all industries) as they get overconfident, and therefore underperform subsequently. This paper is related to a contemporaneous study by Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2009) , who document a negative relation between an increase in a mutual fund's risk level and its subsequent performance. The findings of this paper can be seen as an explanation for the negative correlation documented in Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2009) . Specifically, when managers get overconfident, they become more active in their portfolio choices, thus increase their risk levels, and subsequently underperform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of belief update. Section 3 describes the data and the screening procedures. Section 4 presents the evidence of self-serving attribution bias. Section 5 shows a negative link between excessive confidence and future performance. Section 6 analyzes the across-industry and within-industry portfolio choices. Section 7 reports some robustness checks. Finally, section 8 concludes.
A Stylized Model

Model Setup
We formalize the dynamics of investor overconfidence and derive its effects on investors' portfolio choices and subsequent performance in a simple stylized model. The setup of the model draws extensively on Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) . The economy is populated with a continuous mass of agents. A fraction ω of these agents is informed, denoted by I and the remaining fraction 1-ω is uninformed, denoted by U . For tractability, we assume that both I and U have the same exponential utility function defined on their terminal period consumption, with an absolute risk aversion coefficient γ.
There are two risky securities (A and B) with independent payoffs in the market, and a riskless asset, whose return is normalized to zero. The informed agents receive a common private signal about the payoff of security A. We include security B in the economy so that it is meaningful to think about portfolio weights and possible deviations from the market portfolio. For simplicity, we assume that both risky assets have a fixed supply of $1, so that the market portfolio invests equally in both assets. There are three dates in the model. At date 1, I receives a common private signal s 1 . Both I and U choose their optimal portfolios, and security prices adjust to clear the market. At date 2, a noisy public signal is released. Further trade occurs and prices adjust accordingly. At date 3 (the terminal date), the final payoffs are announced, both securities pay their liquidating dividends, and agents consume. All random variables in the model are independently and normally distributed.
The final payoffs of securities A and B are denoted by θ A and θ B , which are assumed to be independently and normally distributed with mean θ A and θ B and with variance , respectively. Without loss of generality, we set both θ A and θ B to zero. I receives a private signal about θ A at date 1, s 1 = θ + , where ∼ N (0, . We assume I has the correct belief about β at date 1, i.e., β c = β . For simplicity, we further assume that, while the information structure is common knowledge to both I and U , the uninformed do not learn about s 1 from prices.
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At date 2, a public signal arrives, s 2 = θ + η, where η ∼ N (0, 1 βη ). Following Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), we assume that I is subject to the self-serving attribution bias when learning about the precision of his private signal. More specifically, if the public signal announced at date 2 confirms his trade at date 1, the agent becomes more confident; if it disconfirms his trade, the agent becomes less confident, but to a less extent. Formally, we assume that the precision of the private signal perceived by I depends on the realization of the public signal at date 2. If sign(s 1 ) = sign(s 2 ), confidence increases, so the self-perceived noise variance in the private signal decreases to 1 β c,2
. If sign(s 1 ) =sign(s 2 ), confidence decreases, so the self-perceived noise variance in the signal increases to 1 β c,2
. We further assume, without going into details, that a Bayesian agent would update his perceived noise variance to
, if the public signal confirms or disconfirms his private signal. The key assumption of our model is that k > k Bayesian > k. k −k therefore captures the degree of an investor's self-serving attribution bias.
The Benchmark Case
We first study the benchmark case, where agents do not suffer from the self-serving attribution bias, i.e. the perceived noise variance is 1 β Bayesian at date 2. This case outlines how we solve for the equilibrium prices and demands. Prices at date 3 are given by the final payoffs of A and B: P A 3 = θ A and P B 3 = θ B . Because all random variables follow normal distributions and agents have exponential utility functions, by standard portfolio theories, the demand for security A at date 2 is:
(1)
where D A I,2 is the demand by agent I and D A U,2 is the demand by agent U at date 2. Under Bayesian updating,
Applying the market clearing condition (i.e., ωD I + (1 − ω)D U = 1), we have
Therefore,
For security B, since there is no additional information released about its terminal payoff, its demand and price at date 2 are:
The market clearing condition implies that
Equilibrium Prices with the Bias
We now characterize the market equilibrium when I is subject to the self-serving attribution bias. Compared to the benchmark case, the agent's perceived noise variance at date 2 is no longer
. If sign(s 1 ) = sign(s 2 ),
where 1 β c,2
where
. The prices at date 3 are again determined by the liquidating payoffs of the two securities.
Empirical Implications
Since our goal is to understand whether agents suffer from biased attribution, rather than deriving any implications for agents' unconditional overconfidence, we examine how a series of realizations of public signals can affect an agent's confidence and thus his portfolio choice. To this end, we extend our model to span T +2 periods, with T i.i.d. public signals being released before the liquidating dividend is distributed. Denote the average public signal over the T periods by s. Upon the realization of each public signal, I adjusts the perceived precision of his private signal using the biased updating rule. For simplicity, we further assume that k and k remain constant in all periods. The deviation of agent I's portfolio from the market portfolio, which invests $1 in both assets, at date T +1 is given by
n + is the number of periods in which sign(s 1 ) = sign(s t ), and n − = T − n + is the number of periods in which sign(s 1 ) = sign(s t ). The Active Share of I's portfolio (one half of the sum of absolute deviations of I's portfolio weights from the market portfolio) is equal to
It can be readily shown that ActiveShare I,T +1 is a monotonically decreasing function in the perceived noise variance
, and thus is monotonically increasing in n + k − n − k (by taking the natural log of the right hand side of equation (18)). Put differently, managers that attach higher precisions to their private signals are more likely to deviate from their benchmark indices. With some simple algebra, we can write:
The first term in (21) (k − k)n + captures the magnitude of biased attribution, while the second term reflects the updating rule when managers receive disconfirming public signals.
Proposition 1. The Active Share of a portfolio is a monotonically increasing function of
Since we do not observe agents' private signals or the full set of public information that is available in the market, to empirically test Proposition 1, we use realized fund returns as a proxy for whether public signals confirm or disconfirm an agent's private signal. Given that an investor's portfolio choice is (at least partially) based on his private signal, positive subsequent benchmark-adjusted returns would indicate that his private signal is confirmed by (subsequently released) public information; on the other hand, negative benchmark-adjusted returns would indicate that the agent's signal is disconfirmed by public information. Put differently, we can interpret n + (n − ) as the number of periods in which an agent has superior (inferior) returns compared to his benchmark.
While our highly stylized model assumes that the attribution bias (k vs. k) is only determined by the sign of public signals, a more realistic assumption is that both k and k are functions of how strongly a public signal confirms or disconfirms an agent's private signal. To reflect this additional twist, we use the sum of outperformance in place of n + and the absolute sum of underperformance in place of n − . Equation (21) can therefore be rewritten as
We label the first term SP R because it measures the S um of (all) P ositive (Abnormal) Returns in the entire period. The second term also has a simple interpretation: the sum of benchmark-adjusted returns over the same period. A positive relationship between Active Share and SP R, after controling for sumret, is thus evidence of the self-serving attribution bias. Note that a Bayesian, in constrast, has effectively k = k Bayesian = k and his Active Share is not increasing in SP R.
Data
Mutual Fund Data
Mutual fund holdings data are obtained from Thompson Financial's CDA/Spectrum database. We focus on the period 1985 -2006, because there were relatively few actively managed mutual funds in the early 1980s. 7 The database is compiled from mandatory SEC filings as well as voluntary disclosures by mutual funds. Most mutual funds in the database report their holdings on a quarterly basis. Although every fund files its report at the end of a quarter, the date for which the holdings are valid (report date) is often different from the filing date. In some cases, the two dates can differ by a few quarters. The number of shares reported in CDA/Spectrum is split-adjusted as of the filing date. Therefore, in order to get the actual number of shares held on the report date, we undo the adjustment done by CDA/Spectrum. Then to compute the shares held at the nearest quarter-end after the report date, we adjust the number of shares reported by the stock splits between the report date and the quarter end.
Total net assets (TNA), monthly returns, expense ratios, objective codes, and fund age are obtained from the CRSP mutual funds database. We use pre-expense fund returns in our study, i.e., net returns plus 1/12 of yearly expenses.
8 For funds with multiple share classes reported in CRSP, we compute the sum of total net assets in each share class to derive the total net assets of the fund. For net returns and expense ratios, we compute the value-weighted average across all share classes. For other fund characteristics, we use the value from the share class with the largest total net assets. We then use the Mutual Fund Links (MFLinks) dataset to merge CDA/Spectrum with CRSP mutual fund data. MFLinks map over 90% of all domestic equity funds between the two data sources with high accuracy.
Since our focus is on domestic equity funds, we further require each fund to have a Wiesenberger objective code of growth, growth and income, equity income, growth with current income, maximum capital gains, small capitalization growth, or missing. We also require an ICDI fund objective code of aggressive growth, growth and income, income, long-term growth, or missing. Finally, we require the investment objective code reported by CDA/Spectrum to be aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, unclassified, or missing. These restrictions effectively exclude all bond funds, balanced funds, international funds, precious metals, and sector funds. We also exclude index funds from our sample by removing any mutual fund whose name contains "index," "indx," or "idx."
Since a significant number of mutual funds misclassify themselves as equity funds, we compute, for each fund on each report date, the weight of its stock holdings as a percentage of its total net assets. We require the time-series average equity weight to be greater than 80%. Finally, to be included in the sample, we require a fund to have non-missing values for all variables used in the main regression analysis.
9 With the aforementioned screening procedures, we end up with a sample of 46,510 fund-quarter observations and 2,380 distinct mutual funds.
Index Holdings
We include 23 commonly tracked indices from three major US index families in our study. From the S&P/Barra family, we pick S&P 500, S&P500/Barra Growth, S&P500/Barra Value, S&P 400, S&P400/Barra Growth, S&P400/Barra Value, S&P 600, S&P600/Barra Growth, and S&P600/Barra Value. The index holdings data are obtained directly from the parent companies that manage those indices. We have month-end index membership for most indices in our entire sample period. If an index is unavailable (e.g., the Russell indices started in the late 1980s) or the constituents are unknown in a certain month, we use the remaining indices to compute the benchmark for each fund in that month.
Variable Definitions 3.3.1 Active Share and Delta Active Share
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) propose a novel measure, which they label Active Share, to quantify active portfolio management. Active Share is defined as one half of the sum of absolute deviations in terms of portfolio weights of a fund portfolio from its benchmark index:
where w mgr n and w index n are, respectively, the portfolio weights of stock n in the manager's portfolio and in its benchmark index, and N is the total number of stocks in the CRSP monthly stock files.
10 Consider the following simple example: a mutual fund invests 30%
of its total net asset in stock A and 70% in stock B, while its benchmark index invests 40% in stock A and 60% in stock B; the fund's Active Share is then equal to 1/2 * (|30% -40%|+ |70% -60%|) = 10%. One appealing feature of this measure is its easy interpretation.
With an Active Share of 10%, the fund can be viewed as investing 100% of its TNA in the benchmark index and meanwhile taking a side bet of 10% in a self-financed long-short active portfolio. In this case, the active portfolio is to short one dollar in stock A and long one dollar in stock B.
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Since Active Share will change when stock prices (and thus weights) change, our analysis focuses on the change in Active Share that is entirely due to trading, which we term Delta Active Share (∆AS). The Delta Active Share in quarter t is defined as the log Active Share of a manager's reported portfolio at the end of quarter t minus the log Active Share of a hypothetical portfolio had the manager not traded in quarter t. By construction, this measure captures the change in Active Share that is entirely due to active trading taking place in quarter t.
Although mutual funds are required by the U.S. SEC to report their benchmark indices in their prospectus after 1998, such data are not available in any public database. Following Cremers and Petajisto (2009), we compute the Active Share of a fund with respect to all available indices and pick the index with the smallest Active Share as its benchmark. By construction, this index has the most overlap with the fund holdings. 
Mutual Fund Flows
Following prior studies, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), we compute quarterly mutual fund flows as:
where r t is the fund's return in quarter t, and M GN is the increase in T N A (Total Net Assets) due to fund mergers in quarter t. Implicitly, we assume that inflows and outflows occur at the end of a quarter, and investors reinvest their dividends and capital appreciation distributions in the fund. We further assume that after a merger, investors place all their money in the surviving fund.
Unrealized Capital Gains
We calculate the average purchase price for each position in each manager's portfolio, and compute the unrealized gain as the percentage change in the current value over the average purchase value. For example, if a fund purchases 10 shares of stock A at $10 and later purchases another 10 shares at $20, we take the average, i.e., $15/share, as the base purchase price. If today's stock price is $30, the unrealized gain is then ($30-$15)/$15 = 100%. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across mutual funds: the standard deviation of quarterly changes in Active Share is almost 8%. Consistent with prior literature on mutual fund performance evaluation, our sample of mutual funds does not outperform their corresponding benchmark indices. The average benchmark-adjusted return (before fees and expenses) over a year is about 50bp. Given that the average expense ratio in our sample is around 1.3%, the average net-of-fee benchmark-adjusted return of the mutual fund industry is about -80bp a year. The average annual investment flow, average fund age, and average fund size of our sample are 11% of total net assets, 14 years, and $1.03 billion, respectively, all of which are in line with prior studies. The main variable of the study, SP R over a year, has a mean of 9.8% and a standard deviation of 9.1%. SP R is also slightly positively skewed, as it has a lower bound of 0.
Summary Statistics
SP R and Changes in Active Share
This section empirically tests the biased attribution hypothesis. Motivated by the stylized model presented in Section 2, we analyze the impact of biased attribution, as captured by the sum of positive investment returns (SP R) in the previous year, on managers' subsequent portfolio choices, which is summarized by the Active Share measure. We focus on open-end mutual fund managers in our analysis, as we have detailed and comprehensive data on their investment decisions and realized performance.
Regression Specification
To test the effect of SP R on a mutual fund's Active Share, we conduct a panel regression with the following specification:
The dependent variable in the regression, ∆AS i,t , is the change in Active Share of mutual fund i in quarter t that is purely driven by active trading. Put differently, ∆AS i,t is the difference between the Active Share from reported holdings at the end of quarter t and the Active Share based on a hypothetical portfolio had the manager not traded in quarter t. A positive ∆AS thus reflects a manager's discretion to increase the deviation from his benchmark, while a negative ∆AS indicates otherwise.
The main variable on the right hand side of the equation is SP R i,t−4:t−1 , which is defined as the sum of positive benchmark-adjusted monthly returns in the previous twelve months. We conjecture that a typical mutual fund manager has a separate mental account for each monthly return and treats it as a separate confirming signal. We focus on benchmark-adjusted rather than raw mutual fund returns, because if a manager's private signals are confirmed by subsequently released public signals, the manager should outperform his benchmark index. If managers indeed suffer from the self-serving attribution bias, i.e., to increase the perceived precision of their private signals too much when outperforming their benchmark indices and too little when underperforming, we expect a positive coefficient on SP R.
We include a host of control variables that are known to be related to changes in portfolio choices in the regression specification. For example, as suggested by the stylized model, we control for the sum of benchmark-adjusted monthly fund returns (sumret) in quarters t-4 to t-1, in order to capture the baseline update when a manager receives disconfirming public signals. We also control for the tracking error and turnover in the same period to reflect a manager's risk appetite and investment style.
14 In addition, we construct a measure of total unrealized capital gains from a fund's inception date to the end of quarter t-1, to rule out 14 Koijen (2010) finds that time-varying risk aversion could affect managers' Active Share.
alternative behavioral biases, such as the disposition effect and the "house money effect."
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Other observable fund characteristics on the right hand side of the equation include the annual investment flow and the annual expense ratio in quarters t-4 to t-1, age and size dummies, investment objective codes at the end of quarter t-1. Each regression analysis also includes year-fixed effects, and the standard errors of all coefficient estimates are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered by year. 4.2 The Effect of SP R on ∆AS Table 2 presents the regression results. The dependent variable in Column 1 is ∆AS in quarter t. The coefficient of SP R t−4:t−1 is both economically and statistically significant, with a point estimate of 0.06 (t=3.26). More specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in SP R, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase of 0.55% in Active Share in the following quarter. To test the persistence in the effect of SP R on future ∆AS, in Columns 3 and 5, we replace ∆AS t with ∆AS in quarters t+1 and t+2. The effect of SP R remains statistically significant in quarter t+1, and gradually dies off in (and after) quarter t+2. These results suggest that, after controlling for various observable fund characteristics, SP R has a persistent and significantly positive effect on subsequent changes in Active Share, consistent with the prediction of our stylized model. Interestingly, the coefficient on the sum of benchmark-adjusted monthly fund returns, sumret t−4:t−1 , which captures the update of manager beliefs when their private signals are disconfirmed by public signals (k in (21)), is in most cases insignificant (or marginally significant), and has a negative sign. This result suggests that managers do not decrease the perceived precision of their private signals upon receiving disconfirming public signals, consistent with the notion that they blame bad luck or external factors for failures. One might be concerned about the correlation between SP R, sumret, and tracking error because all of them are calculated using past returns. In unreported tests we run separate regressions by excluding one or two of these variables. In the absense of the other two variables, the coefficients of SP R, sumret, and tracking error are all positive (in the three separate regressions), and the effect of SP R on Delta Active Share is the strongest. When we only exclude SP R, the coefficients of sumret and tracking error are both positive, but with lower 15 Thaler and Johnson (1990) , in a series of experiments, find that agents with prior gains are more likely to accept gambles. In the context of mutual fund managers' portfolio choices, those with prior superior performance may be more risk-tolerant and thus have larger active positions.
16 In unreported results, we also cluster standard errors by fund. Clustering at the year level gives much more conservative (larger) estimates of standard errors.
t-stats and economic significance than SP R in Table 2 . These results suggests that while the three variables are correlated, SP R has a significant residual impact even after we control for sumret and tracking error. We argue that this impact is evidence of the self-serving attribution bias.
For the control variables, neither the tracking error nor the turnover in the previous year has any significant impact on changes in Active Share, as these variables capture the level of risk aversion and investment styles. Lagged investment flows have a negative effect on ∆AS, likely due to rebalancing motives; upon receiving new investment, managers may initially invest the new capital in a few liquid stocks and gradually diversify in subsequent periods.
Overconfidence and Fund Age
The results from the baseline regression analysis suggest that the average mutual fund manager suffers from the self-serving attribution bias. In this subsection, we provide further evidence for the biased attribution hypothesis by exploiting the cross-sectional difference in managerial experiences. Specifically, we predict that more experienced managers, who are more likely to follow Bayesian updating rules and are also more certain about the precision of their private signals, are less affected by the attribution bias.
Since the data on managers' experiences in the financial industry are not readily available, we proxy for this information using the age of each mutual fund. At the end of each quarter, we sort all mutual funds into quartiles based on the number of years each mutual fund has been in existence in the CRSP database. We then add the interaction terms of age quartile dummies with the SP R measure in the baseline regression specification.
The regression results, shown in Table 3 , suggest that the impact of biased attribution, captured by SP R, on subsequent changes in Active Share, is highly statistically significant for mutual funds in the bottom age quartile and is insignificant for those in the top age quarter. In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on SP R in the bottom age quartile is almost 25 times larger than the coefficient in the top age quartile. These results are consistent with our intuition that inexperienced managers are more easily affected by behavioral biases, and that experienced ones who have learned from their prior mistakes are likely immune from these biases.
SP R and Future Fund Performance
If managers suffer from the self-serving attribution bias and make suboptimal decisions, we should see deteriorating future performance as a function of SP R. To test this prediction, we conduct the following panel regression analysis:
ret i,t+1:t+k = α + β 1 AS i,t−1 + β 2 ∆AS t + β 3 SP R i,t−4:t−1 + β 4 * sumret i,t−4:t−1 + γ * control t−1 .
(28) We employ a variety of measures of fund performance as the dependent variable; for example, the raw average fund returns in the next three, six, and twelve months, as well as the Carhart four-factor fund alpha in the subsequent five years (we require at least 24 months of data when calculating the alpha). While most prior studies on mutual fund performance focus on fund returns in the following month or quarter, we extend our analysis to long-term fund returns, as the effect of overconfidence on portfolio returns is likely to show up over the long-run, rather than in the immediate future.
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The independent variables in the regression specification include the sum of positive returns in quarters t-4 to t-1 (SP R t−4:t−1 ), the Active Share at the end of quarter t-1 (AS t−1 ), and the change in Active Share in quarter t (∆AS t ). Put differently, if we think of quarter t as the event quarter, in which managers update their beliefs about the quality of their private signals, we are then interested in examining how pre-event SP R is related to postevent mutual fund performance. Our main prediction is that β 3 is significantly negative. Specifically, since SP R brings about unwarranted confidence and hence poor investment decisions in quarter t, we should see poor future performance.
We also include a list of control variables on the right hand side of the regression, such as the sum of benchmark-adjusted monthly fund returns, the expense ratio, and the cumulative investment flows in the previous four quarters, as well as fund size, age, and objective codes at the end of quarter t-1. The standard errors of all coefficients are clustered at the year level. (We also compute standard errors clustered at both the firm level, and the results are qualitatively unchanged.)
The empirical evidence generally supports the prediction that biased attribution negatively impacts future fund performance. In Table 4 Panel A, we use short-term fund returns as the dependent variable; specifically, we look at monthly fund returns (before fees and expenses) in the next three, six, and twelve months in Columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively.
The β 3 coefficients in all three regression specifications are negative, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level in Column 5. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in SP R in quarters t-4 to t-1 leads to a reduction of 2.5% in returns (t=-2.19) in the subsequent year.
Moreover, consistent with Cremers and Petajisto (2009), we find that Active Share positively predicts future abnormal performance. Surprisingly, the predictive power comes exclusively from lagged Active Share, rather than the most recent change in Active Share. In fact, in two out of the three regression specifications, ∆AS significantly and negatively predicts subsequent fund performance. Since we control for SP R in our regression, Delta Active Share is presumably only capturing the effect of information-driven update of the portfolio. Consequently, if managers have superior stock picking ability, it should be more evident in the changes in Active Share. There are two potential explanations for this puzzling finding. First, while Active Share is a general measure of manager ability, it is unclear how new information should affect Active Share temporarily; it may be the case that sometimes moving toward the benchmark is a wise decision. Second, this finding is consistent with the result in Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2009) that managers with increasing risk-taking on average have lower subsequent returns, likely due to agency issues.
In Panel B of Table 4 , we examine the mutual fund performance predictability of SP R over the long run. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the monthly four factor alpha based on realized fund returns (before fees and expenses) in quarters t to t+19. Consistent with the findings in Panel A, the β 3 coefficient in Column 1 is both economically and statistically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in SP R leads to a reduction of about 60bp (t=-3.20) per annum in realized fund alpha in the following five years.
Since realized fund returns reported by CRSP are net of transactions costs and excessive trading can also trigger poor performance, we next examine to what extent the negative relation between SP R and future fund performance is due to poor portfolio choices and to what extent it is due to excessive trading. To answer this question, we conduct the same regression analysis using the alpha implied by mutual fund holdings; we construct a hypothetical return series based on the assumption that each fund manager keeps his reported holdings for the entire following quarter.
18 The results, shown in Column 3, suggest that poor portfolio choices are largely responsible for the subsequent underperformance. The estimate of β 3 in Column 3 is only marginally smaller than that in Column 1. Specifically, A one-standard-deviation increase in SP R leads to a reduction of about 49bp (t=-2.51) per year in holdings implied alpha.
The negative link between SP R and future fund performance that we document in this section has two important implications. First, it adds to the extensive literature that tries to identify managers with superior skills. But instead of identifying skills, we point out which managers that investors should avoid. Specifically, investors should not only pay attention to the cumulative past returns of a fund manager, but also his return path. If a manager experiences a large SP R, he is likely to get overly confident in his skills, which lowers his future returns. Moreover, the negative link also completes the picture of the dynamics of investor overconfidence. An overconfident manager tends to experience sub-par returns in the future, which in turn deflates his confidence. As a result, a typical fund manager cannot get infinitely overconfident.
Across-Industry and Within-Industry Active Share
In this section we examine more closely the changes in fund managers' portfolios in response to SP R. In particular, we partition Active Share to two components: the Across-Industry Active Share (AIAS), which measures a portfolio's deviation from the benchmark in industry weights, and the Within-Industry Active Share (W IAS), which measures the average deviation within a typical industry. This partition allows us to study whether managers are picking industries or picking stocks when they increase their Active Share. The AIAS and W IAS are defined as follows.
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AcrossIndustryActiveShare(AIAS) = 1 2
where N i is the number of stocks in industry i and I is the total number of industries. 20 Note that there will be more across-industry variation in Active Share if the industry classification is more refined, but this comes at the cost of lower average variation in within-industry Active Share. In light of this tradeoff, we use the 48-industry classification in Fama and French (1997) in our study. Our decision to dissect Active Share along the industry dimension is motivated by the finding by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) that industry concentration is an important predictor of future fund performance. 21 One interpretation of their results is that some managers have superior information in selecting profitable stocks in specific industries, and therefore tilt their portfolio weights disproportionally to those industries. Alternatively, some managers may be good industry timers, who load more heavily on those industries with high expected returns. On the other hand, W IAS may also be a strong predictor of future fund performance if some managers are good stock pickers in general.
We calculate ∆AIAS and ∆W IAS in a way similar to ∆AS (Delta Active Share) in Section 3.3.1, and replace ∆AS in the main regression in Table 2 with these two variables. Table 5 presents these results. Given a positive SP R, managers increase their WithinIndustry Active Share and keep their Across-Industry Active Share almost unchanged. A one-standard-deviation increase in SP R causes the W IAS to increase by 0.86% (or 1.19% of the average W IAS), and the AIAS to go up by only 0.04% (or 0.10% of the average AIAS). The effect of SP R on W IAS is significant at the 1% level while that on AIAS is not statistically significant.
We then study whether AIAS or W IAS can predict future fund performance, using alphas based on net returns and gross returns. The results are presented in Table 6 . Consistent with Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) , lagged Across-Industry Active Share significantly (at the 1% level) predicts future fund returns; a one-standard-deviation increase in the measure raises future abnormal returns by 57bp (using net returns) and 54bp (using gross returns) annually. In contrast, increasing lagged Within-Industry Active Share by one standard deviation raises fund alpha by 25bp (using net returns) and 15bp (using gross returns) per annum, and the effect is only marginally significant in net returns and is insignificant in gross returns. With gross returns, changes in AIAS can also predict future fund performance, consistent with the claim that some managers have information 21 The concentration measure is different from the Active Share measure in that the former sums up the square of differences, while the latter sums up the absolute deviations. advantages in specific industries.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that one source of activeness has strong performance implications while the other does not. In response to high SP R, managers increase the "bad" Active Share by picking stocks within industries.
When managers increase their W IAS after a high SP R, do they pick stocks within industries they have information advantages in or not? We calculate another measure to examine this follow-up question. For each fund-quarter, the correlation between industry weights and within-industry deviations is given by:
where IndW ght represents the abnormal portfolio weight in each industry compared to the benchmark, and Deviation is the summand in the W IAS calculation. A positive correlation implies that managers are more active stock pickers in industries with larger abnormal weights. Moreover, since AIAS predicts future performance, industries with large abnormal weights tend to be those in which managers have information advantages. Table 7 shows the results of the regression of Corr(IndW ght, Deviation) on lagged SP R and other control variables. The effect of lagged SP R on the correlation is negatively significant. Together with the result in Table 5 that managers do not substantially alter the industry weights as they get overconfident, the negative impact of lagged SP R on the correlation suggests that managers pick stocks more actively in industries where they do not have skills. It is possible that fund managers, who are good at selecting a few industries, become overconfident in their private signals about all stocks after achieving a high SP R. They subsequently earn a low future abnormal return due to the sub-optimal portfolio choices.
Robustness Checks
Other Measures of Overconfidence
We examine the effect of SP R on other measures of mutual fund activeness. Prior literature suggests two additional such measures: fund turnover and tracking errors. In Table 8 , we repeat our regression analysis based on equation (27), but instead we use turnover and tracking errors in quarter t as the dependent variable. The results are consistent with our model prediction that SP R is positively related to managers' activeness subsequently. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in SP R, ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in quarterly turnover by 4.4% (t=2.81), which is close to one eighth of the average quarterly turnover of mutual funds.
22 Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase in SP R is related to an increase in tracking error by 1.3% (t=7.24), which is almost two thirds of the average monthly tracking error. 23 Overall, the results of this study suggest that SP R, a measure of confirming signals, is strongly and positively related to mutual fund managers' confidence, as measured by Active Share, turnover, and tracking errors.
Other Ways to Calculate SP R
(For brevity, the results of the robustness tests in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 are not reported.)
In the main empirical analysis we use the sum of outperformance as a proxy for n + and the absolute sum of underperformance as a proxy for n − . We define two sets of alternative measures. The first set uses the number of months with positive and negative benchmarkadjusted returns as n + and n − , repsectively. In the second set we put larger weights on more recent returns. When summing the outperformance and underperformance in the previous twleve months, we assign a weight that decreases with the difference between the return month and the month that the independent variable is measured (the closest month receives a weight of 12/78, the month before 11/78, and the most distant month 1/78, etc.). Our main conclusion remains unchanged.
Managers' Incentives to Increase Activeness
We conduct two additional tests to further distinguish the effect of the bias from fund managers' rational incentives to increase fund flows. One potential explanation of our findings is that SP R is a proxy for managers' incentives to increase risk to exploit the non-linear flowperformance relationship. Under such scenario we could observe a difference in managers' risk-taking behavior in the last quarter of the year because investors care about year-end performance, as shown by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) . However, when we add an extra 22 A contemporaneous study by Putz and Ruenzi (2010) also shows that mutual fund managers trade more after good performance.
23 It is perhaps surprising that the coefficient on T rackingError(12 − month) t−4:t−1 is negatively significant in the regression of T rackingError(3 − month) t−1:t . However, when we run the same regression without SP R t−4:t−1 , the coefficient on T rackingError(12 − month) t−4:t−1 becomes positive (42.914) and is significant at the 1% level (t = 5.65).
interaction term of SP R and a dummy variable indicating the last quarter of the year, the coefficent on the interaction term is not statistically significant, suggesting that the relationship between Delta Active Share and SP R is not different in these quarters. Besides, it is also possible that managers react to SP R and increase their Active Share to attract fund flows (e.g., if investors derive utility from associating themselves with active or overconfident managers). We do not find evidence consistent with this prediction in a regression of flows on lagged SP R and other variables. There is no significant relationship between future fund flows and SP R.
Conclusion
This paper is one of the first empirical attempts to analyze the dynamics of investor overconfidence. Using Active Share as a proxy, we find that mutual fund managers accumulate unwarranted confidence as they take too much credit for successes and too little blame for failures. We also document that manager overconfidence is associated with future underperformance. Moreover, the underperformance is almost entirely driven by managers' poor portfolio choices; in particular, their decisions to place more active bets in industries that they are unfamiliar with (i.e., industries that they underweight relative to their benchmark indices). Taken together, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that even sophisticated investors like active mutual fund managers are prone to fall prey to certain behavioral biases.
Our paper also sheds light on the determinants of Active Share. Prior literature has identified managerial ability and risk aversion as two main determinants of Active Share and has established a strong positive link between the component that reflects managerial ability and future fund performance. Our results suggest a third determinant of Active Share -manager overconfidence, which is negatively related to future fund performance. More specifically, overconfident managers attach too high quality to their private signals, hence deviate too much from their benchmark indices than they should otherwise, and consequently underperform. Future research on Active Share should carefully disentangle those three components in order to accurately measure managerial ability. Sum of Positive Returns (SPR ) is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Tracking Error (12-month ) and (3-month ) are the standard deviation of the benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months and past 3 months, respectively. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Unrealized Gains are the cumulative unrealized gains divided by total purchase value. Turnover is the annual sum of all purchases and sales divided by the value of total holdings. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Fund Age is the number of years since fund inception. Size is the total net assets of the fund.
This table presents the summary statistics for our sample of actively managed mutual funds. Active Share is calculated as one half of the sum of absolute deviations in portfolio weights of an active portfolio from its benchmark index. Delta Active Share is the log Active Share of the reported portfolio minus the log Active Share of a hypothetical portfolio had the manager not traded in the quarter. Across-Industry Active Share (AIAS ) and Within-Industry Active Share (WIAS ) are similar to Active Share , calculated using the deviation from the benchmark's industry weights and the average deviation within a typical industry, respectively. Delta AIAS and Delta WIAS are similar to Delta Active Share and are the corresponding measures for AIAS and WIAS , respectively.
Realized Alpha (60-month ) and Holdings Alpha (60-month ) are the monthly four-factor fund alphas, calculated based on monthly net returns from CRSP and gross returns from stock holdings, respectively, over the prior 60 months. Average 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month Fund Return are, respectively, the monthly average 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month net returns from CRSP. Corr (Ind Wght , Deviation ) is the correlation between benchmark-adjusted industry weights and within-industry deviations from the benchmark.
All coefficients are x 100
Delta Active Delta Active Delta Active SPR is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Tracking Error (12-month ) is the standard deviation of the benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Unrealized Gains are the cumulative unrealized gains divided by total purchase value. Turnover is the annual sum of all purchases and sales divided by the value of total holdings. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Investment Obj Code 2 -4 are investment objective code dummies (2 = aggressive growth, 3 = growth, 4 = growth and income). Fund Age Q 1 -Q 4 and Size Q 1 -Q 4 are, respectively, the age and total net asset quartile dummies (1 = youngest or largest). The subscript t represents quarter t and the timing of the variables (e.g., Delta Active Share t-1:t is calculated from quarter t -1 to t ). Intercepts and estimates on the year dummies are not reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent time-clustered t -statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. The table reports the regression of Delta Active Share on the interaction terms of SPR (Sum of Positive Returns) with Fund Age , the sum of benchmark-adjusted returns, and other fund characteristics. Delta Active Share is the log Active Share of the reported portfolio minus the log Active Share of a hypothetical portfolio had the manager not traded in the quarter. Active Share is calculated as one half of the sum of absolute deviations in portfolio weights of an active portfolio from its benchmark index. Fund Age Q 1 -Q 4 are the age (number of years since inception) quartile dummies (1 = youngest).
Heteroskedasticity-consistent time-clustered t -statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.
SPR is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Tracking Error (12-month ) is the standard deviation of the benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Unrealized Gains are the cumulative unrealized gains divided by total purchase value. Turnover is the annual sum of all purchases and sales divided by the value of total holdings. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Investment Obj Code 2 -4 are investment objective code dummies (2 = aggressive growth, 3 = growth, 4 = growth and income). Size Q 1 -Q 4 are the total net asset quartile dummies (1 = largest). The subscript t represents quarter t and the timing of the variables (e.g., Delta Active Share t-1:t is calculated from quarter t -1 to t ). Intercepts and estimates on the year dummies are not reported. B) . 3-month , 6-month , and 12-month Fund Return are, respectively, the monthly average 3-month, 6-month, and 12-month net returns from CRSP. Realized Alpha (60-month ) and Holdings Alpha (60-month ) are the monthly four-factor fund alphas, calculated based on monthly net returns from CRSP and gross returns from stock holdings, respectively, over the prior 60 months. Active Share is calculated as one half of the sum of absolute deviations in portfolio weights of an active portfolio from its benchmark index. Delta Active Share is the log Active Share of the reported portfolio minus the log Active Share of a hypothetical portfolio had the manager not traded in the quarter. SPR is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Size is the total net assets of the fund. Investment Obj Code 2 -4 are investment objective code dummies (2 = aggressive growth, 3 = growth, 4 = growth and income). Fund Age Q 1 -Q 4 are the age quartile dummies (1 = youngest). The subscript t represents quarter t and the timing of the variables (e.g., 3-month Fund Return t :t +1 is calculated from quarter t to t +1). Intercepts and estimates on the year dummies are not reported. SPR is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Tracking Error (12-month ) is the standard deviation of the benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Unrealized Gains are the cumulative unrealized gains divided by total purchase value. Turnover is the annual sum of all purchases and sales divided by the value of total holdings. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Investment Obj Code 2 -4 are investment objective code dummies (2 = aggressive growth, 3 = growth, 4 = growth and income). Fund Age Q 1 -Q 4 and Size Q1 -Q4 are, respectively, the age and total net asset quartile dummies (1 = youngest or largest). The subscript t represents quarter t and the timing of the variables (e.g., Delta Active Share t-1:t is calculated from quarter t -1 to t ). Intercepts and estimates on the year dummies are not reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent time-clustered t -statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5%
and 1% significance, respectively. (60-month ) . Realized Alpha (60-month ) and Holdings Alpha (60-month ) are monthly four-factor fund alphas, calculated based on monthly net returns from CRSP and gross returns from stock holdings, respectively, over the prior 60 months.
Across-Industry Active Share (AIAS ) is calculated as one half of the sum of absolute deviations in industry weights of an active portfolio from its benchmark index. Within-Industry Active Share (WIAS ) is the average deviation within a typical industry. Delta AIAS and Delta WIAS are the log AIAS and log WIAS of the reported portfolio minus the corresponding measure of a hypothetical portfolio had the manager not traded in the quarter. SPR is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Size is the total net assets of the fund. Investment Obj Code 2 -4 are investment objective code dummies (2 = aggressive growth, 3 = growth, 4 = growth and income). Fund Age Q 1 -Q 4 are the age quartile dummies (1 = youngest). The subscript t represents quarter t and the timing of the variables (e.g., Realized Alpha (60-month ) t :t +19 is calculated from quarter t to t +19).
Intercepts and estimates on the year dummies are not reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent time-clustered t -statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. SPR is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Tracking Error (12-month ) is the standard deviation of the benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Unrealized Gains are the cumulative unrealized gains divided by total purchase value. Turnover is the annual sum of all purchases and sales divided by the value of total holdings. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Investment Obj Code 2 -4 are investment objective code dummies (2 = aggressive growth, 3 = growth, 4 = growth and income). Fund Age Q 1 -Q 4 and Size Q 1 -Q 4 are, respectively, the age and total net asset quartile dummies (1 = youngest or largest). The subscript t represents quarter t and the timing of the variables (e.g., Corr (Ind Wght , Deviation ) t is calculated in quarter t ). Intercepts and estimates on the year dummies are not reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent time-clustered t -statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. The table reports the regression of confidence proxies on SPR (Sum of Positive Returns), the sum of benchmarkadjusted returns, and other fund characteristics. The confidence proxies are Turnover and Tracking Error (3 -month ). Turnover is the annual sum of all purchases and sales divided by the value of total holdings. Tracking Error (3-month ) and (12-month ) are the standard deviation of the benchmark-adjusted returns in the 3 months starting quarter t -1 and in the 12 months starting quarter t -4, respectively.
SPR is the sum of positive monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Sumret is the sum of monthly benchmark-adjusted returns in the past 12 months. Flow is the annual flow divided by the total net assets. Unrealized Gains are the cumulative unrealized gains divided by total purchase value. Expenses is the annual expense ratio. Investment Obj Code 2 -4 are investment objective code dummies (2 = aggressive growth, 3 = growth, 4 = growth and income). Fund Age Q 1 -Q 4 and Size Q 1 -Q 4 are, respectively, the age and total net asset quartile dummies (1 = youngest or largest). The subscript t represents quarter t and the timing of the variables (e.g., Tracking Error (3-month ) t -1:t is calculated from quarter t -1 to t ). Intercepts and estimates on the year dummies are not reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent time-clustered t -statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
